This paper looks empirically at the implications that protectionist measures implemented during the current crisis may have had for a country's ability to attract foreign direct investment. The research utilizes data on such measures that is available from Global Trade Alert, combined with bilateral FDI data between OECD countries and a large number of partner countries for 2006 to 2009. This allows us to examine the short run effect that protectionist measures may have had on bilateral FDI flows. The verdict from this analysis is clear: a country that implements new protectionist measures may expect that this may result in lower foreign direct investment inflows into the economy. The point estimates from our preferred specifications suggest that, depending on the empirical model, the implementation of a trade protection measure is associated with about 40 to 80 percent lower FDI inflows. Trade protection does not appear to have any implications for the country's FDI outflows, however. The negative effect on FDI inflows does not appear to be due to direct investment measures but rather to actions related to intellectual property rights protection and other more trade related measures.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows were hit hard by the financial crisis. According to the 1 Furthermore, the abolition of trade barriers may make domestic companies a more attractive target for foreign acquirers, thus suggesting that trade protection should discourage FDI (Norbäck and Persson, 2004) .
Moreover, trade protection implemented during the crisis may signal economic uncertainty to possible foreign investors and, hence, discourage FDI.
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This paper looks empirically at the implications that protectionist measures implemented during the crisis may have had for a country's ability to attract foreign direct investment. The research utilizes data on such measures that is available from Global
Trade Alert. This is combined with bilateral FDI data between OECD countries and a large number of partner countries, including many developing and least developed countries.
The analysis looks at data for the period 2006 to 2009 in order to examine the short run effect that protectionist measures may have had on bilateral FDI flows.
The empirical approach taken in this paper is to estimate a gravity model of FDI which also includes dummy variables for whether or not measures of state protection were implemented since 2008. Assuming that all countries were affected by the crisis and controlling for time invariant characteristics common to all countries that implemented such measures this is, then, akin to a difference-in-differences analysis which allows us to identify the effect of protection measures on FDI flows.
The next section describes in more detail the empirical approach and the data set.
Some descriptive statistics are then presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the econometric results and Section 5 provides some conclusions.
1 For example, the knowledge capital model (Markusen, 2002) implies both of these possibilities for positive and negative relationships between trade costs and FDI when considering horizontal or vertical FDI, respectively. See Hijzen et al. (2008) for some empirical evidence on the relationship between trade costs and foreign direct investment through mergers & acquisitions, distinguishing horizontal and vertical FDI. 2 Campa (1993) , based on the theoretical framework by Dixit (1989) , for example shows that uncertainty about exchange rates may discourage foreign direct investment. This uncertainty argument can be similarly applied to other economic factors, such as uncertainty about trade openness or institutional characteristics.
Empirical Methodology and Data
The empirical strategy is to estimate gravity type equations explaining FDI flows. These equations have the following form:
where the dependent variable is defined as foreign direct investment flows between source country i and host country j at time t (t = 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) . A list of variables with definitions and data sources is provided in Table A1 in the appendix.
The first set of explanatory variables are gravity type covariates as, for example, used in the analysis by Carr et al., (2001) or Blonigen et al. (2003) . These are the sum of source and host country GDP, the absolute difference thereof, and the absolute difference in terms of per capita GDP between the two countries. These variables control for level and differences in market size, and differences in factor endowments or purchasing power. The distance between i and j is also included to control for the overall level of trade costs between the two countries. Note that these covariates are included as lagged variables in order to minimize simultaneity considerations. and extended by own calculations.
In robustness checks we also include further explanatory variables, which we also discuss in Section 4. We use data on exports and imports which are available from the World Development Indicators. We also check for the impact of the regulatory quality in the host and source countries for which we employ data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank. The index is transformed to match the scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Furthermore, we include a dummy that is one if both countries share a common border and a dummy that indicates whether both jurisdictions share a common official language. These data come from the Centre d
'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPI).

Descriptive Statistics
The Global Table A2 in the appendix provides a list of the countries in our sample distinguishing those that did implement some measures of severity category amber or red and those that did not. In contrast to Evenett (2011) , this table does not give a ranking by number of measures implemented, however.
As shown in Table 1 , the majority of actions taken by countries were trade protection measures. Less than 7 percent of all measures were more directly related to FDI by targeting investment (including local content requirements) and intellectual property rights. In our data, about 40 percent of countries have implemented some sort of protectionist measure captured in the GTA database. In a first look at a possible relationship between FDI and protectionist measures, Table 2 shows summary statistics on FDI flows and GDP, distinguishing countries in our sample that implemented measures from those that did not. The table shows that, on average, larger countries tended to revert to trade protection in the face of crisis, and that these countries also attracted, on average, substantially higher FDI inflows and outflows pre-crisis. During the crisis, however, these countries experienced much smaller growth rates of FDI than countries that abstained from protection.
Hence, at a first glance, there seems to be a negative association between the implementation of trade protection measures and changes in FDI. Of course, these relationships may be confounded by the influence of other bilateral characteristics, which we can control for in the regression analysis. We therefore now turn to the econometric analysis of the gravity model described in equation (1). 
Econometric Results
The baseline regression results are reported in Table 3 . We estimate two variants of the empirical model. The first one, shown in columns 1 to 3 of the table, includes only the basic gravity type variables as described in equation (1). The second model includes further control variables which we turn back to below. Both models are estimated using three estimators: OLS, bilateral fixed effects and a random effects tobit technique. The OLS estimator provides some benchmark estimates for the gravity model. Since the fixed effects technique controls comprehensively for any time invariant country pair specific unobservables, this estimator is best suited to identify the coefficients in our differencein-differences model. Hence, we see the fixed effects model as our preferred specification.
The random effects tobit estimator is included as a robustness check as it takes into consideration that the dependent variable is bounded at zero. The estimation results in the table show that the coefficients on the gravity type covariates are as expected from the discussion in Carr et al. (2001) . A larger combined market is positively correlated with FDI flows, while size differences discourage FDI.
Differences in factor endowments are also positively correlated with FDI. This latter variable indicates that FDI activity is high between countries that have different factor endowments. This suggests that vertical FDI and global production networks are important motives for part of the FDI in our sample. Distance is also negatively associated with FDI flows, indicating that general trade, investment and communication costs, which can be assumed to increase with distance, matter for FDI activity.
One point to note is that the estimated coefficients are much weaker when using a fixed effects estimator. This model includes bilateral fixed effects and, hence, estimates are identified over the variation over time within country pairs. Given that we only use four years of data, this time variation is relatively low.
6 However, we prefer this estimator as it controls comprehensively for any time invariant unobservables that may otherwise be biasing our estimates.
Turning to the other controls, we estimate positive and statistically significant coefficients on the dummy variables indicating countries that implemented trade protection measures during the crisis (TREATED). This positive association indicates that countries that implemented such measures are also the countries that attract high levels of FDI -or, more precisely, they are countries that have FDI flows that are higher than those that would be predicted by the pure gravity relationships (size, differences, and distance).
Similarly, we estimate in some specifications positive coefficients on CRISIS, the dummy that is equal to one for all countries in the years 2008 and 2009. This does, of course, not show that FDI flows increased during the crisis. Rather, it indicates that countries in general experience higher FDI flows than those expected when controlling for GDP and differences in per capita GDP. In other words, the declines in bilateral FDI activity have not been as strong as may have been expected given the negative implications of the crisis for GDP and GDP per capita.
The main variables of interest are, of course, the dummies on the implementation of state protection measures during the crisis. Here the results show that, all other things equal, a host country that implemented such a measure experienced lower FDI inflows.
Taking the point estimate of the coefficient in column (2) at face value suggests that countries that implemented a measure experience roughly 43 percent lower FDI inflows than countries that did not. 7 Implementation does not seem to affect FDI outflows of a country, however, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant coefficient on PROTECT for the source country. Before we turn to interpreting this finding, we concern ourselves with establishing how robust this result is to changes in the specification of the empirical model.
The estimations in columns 4 to 6 include further control variables. We include the level of bilateral exports and imports between source and host, GDP growth of both countries, and dummies for a common border or a common language. These are essentially further gravity type variables that proxy for the nature of the trade relationship between source and host country. The estimated coefficients are largely as expected.
Trade is positively associated with FDI flows, as is GDP growth in the host (but not necessarily source) country. FDI flows are also higher between countries that share a common language, ceteris paribus.
7 Since the dependent variable is in natural logs, the effect of a dummy can be calculated as exp(β)-1 .
Furthermore, we include an index of regulatory quality in the two countries. The regulation variable attempts to proxy for aspects of the institutional environment that may be correlated with the implementation of state protection measures during the crisis.
The estimations suggest that better institutional quality, as evidenced by a better regulatory quality, is positively associated with FDI flows between two countries.
As regards our results on the implementation of state protection measures, the reassuring result of the estimations in columns 4 to 6 is that our conclusions drawn thus far are robust to the inclusion of these further variables. 8 Hence, the implementation of state protection measures that discriminate against foreign commercial interest in general have negative repercussions for FDI inflows in the implementing country. On the other hand, this does not appear to affect FDI outflows from the country, all other things equal.
The outward investment activities of firms in these countries seem to be unaffected by government measures that are aimed at protecting the domestic country against foreign competition.
Types of measures
There are various forms of protectionist measures that countries have implemented during the crisis. Thus far these are lumped together in the analysis. In a further step we now distinguish two types that may be most related to investment, namely, explicit investment measures and measures related to intellectual property rights protection. We look at these in turn in Tables 4 and 5 . 8 In a further robustness check we estimate a model that does not include the logs of FDI as dependent variable but the normal values. This produces similar results, a negative relationship between protection implemented by a host country and FDI inflows. Results are not produced here to save space. We now have two PROTECT variables per country. One is a dummy equal to one after the introduction of an investment related measure. A second dummy is equal to one if a country implemented any other type of protection measure. 9 The result is quite clear:
all other things equal, the implementation of an investment related measure has no significant association with FDI flows. However, other protectionist measures are, as before, negatively associated with FDI inflows in the implementing country. Table 5 considers intellectual property rights protection. An example of such measures is the action taken by China to give accreditation to suppliers of certain high tech products. In order to be able to gain such accreditation, firms must be located in China and must be able to proof their ownership of intellectual property rights to make certain products. This measure would, thus, clearly increase protection for Chinese domestic firms.
The implementation of such IPR related measures is negatively associated with FDI inflows for host countries. This is as one may expect, since these actions in many cases discriminate against foreign firms. Note also that other measures still have a negative effect, as before. We also find that IPR measures reduce FDI outflows from countries that implement them. In other words, measures relevant to IPR protection discourage FDI outflows as firms may be less willing to operate abroad. Perhaps this form of protection, which allows domestic firms to eschew foreign competition, removes the perceived need for firms to expand operations in foreign markets. 
Neighbour effects
The analysis thus far has concentrated on actions taken by the host and source countries, respectively. However, Head and Mayer (2004) show that the decision of a firm to invest abroad does not just depend on the characteristics of the individual country.
Rather, the market potential of a given host country also depends on the characteristics of neighbouring countries. In the context of state intervention, protectionist measures taken by a given host country's neighbour may make the host country less attractive to foreign firms since, for example, exporting from host to neighbour may become more costly. In a first attempt to look at this issue we simply generate a dummy variable that is equal to one if any country that shares a common border with the host (or source) implemented protectionist measures. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6 . Two points are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, the inclusion of the neighbour effects does not change the result that there is a negative effect from the implementation of a protectionist measure by a host country on its FDI inflows. The point estimate is, however, now slightly higher than in Table 3 , the coefficient in column (2) suggests that the implementation of a protectionist measure is associated with about 77 percent lower FDI inflows. Secondly, there is some evidence of negative effects of neighbours' actions on FDI inflows into a host country, though the coefficients are not statistically significant in all cases.
In order to investigate this a little further we include an additional analysis. In this case we calculate for each host (and source) country the percentage of neighbouring countries that have implemented an action reported by Global Trade Alert. We include these variables in the regression equation; the results are reported in Table 7 . The conclusion on the negative effect of a state measure on the host countries is again robust, and the coefficient size is roughly similar to that in Table 4 . We also, as before, estimate negative coefficients on the variable capturing the percentage of neighbouring countries that implemented a measure, though these are in none of the cases statistically significant.
Hence, while the results provide some weak indication that neighbours' activities matter for host countries, this result is not very robust. All regressions include year dummies; Time varying gravity style explanatory variables are lagged one period; Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Columns 4 to 6 include additional covariates as in Table 3 , these are not reported to save space
Conclusions
The verdict from this analysis is clear: a country that implements new protectionist measures may expect that this may result in lower foreign direct investment inflows into the economy. The point estimates from our preferred specifications suggest that, depending on the empirical model, the implementation of a trade protection measure is associated with about 40 to 80 percent lower FDI inflows. Trade protection does not appear to have any implications for the country's FDI outflows, however. The negative effect on FDI inflows does not appear to be due to direct investment measures but rather to actions related to intellectual property rights protection and other more trade related measures. One possible interpretation of this is that FDI is deterred since the protectionist measure discourages trade and activities of global production networks, where the free flow of goods and services between firms in different countries is of high importance.
Another possibility is that the implementation of protectionist measures signals uncertainty about trade openness or the general institutional environment to potential investors. These two interpretations are, of course, not mutually exclusive.
These research findings have important implications for the commercial interests of less and least developed countries. Many of the "offending" countries are emerging or developing economies. For them, the harm done to their own economy may be particularly severe. It is well accepted that foreign direct investments into such economies may have strong beneficial effects on economic growth, firm productivity, wages and employment (e.g., Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004, Görg and Greenaway, 2004) . Given that protectionist measures can deter inflows of FDI these beneficial effects may be impeded, possibly leading to adverse implications for the economic performance and growth perspectives of these countries. 
